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Corporate Governance and Elites 
Abstract 
Using a qualitative methodology (interviews), we examine the relationship between the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and elitist interventions. In doing this, we 
identify three elitist groups ± political, cultural and religious, and investigate how they shape 
the legitimacy and effectiveness (or otherwise) of the institutional drivers of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Our discussions show the role of elites in influencing corporate 
governance outcomes in weak institutional environments. Further, we caution the widely-held 
notion in the literature which suggests that institutions act as a check on the behaviour of elites 
and influence how elites compete and emerge. Alternatively, we argue that the emergence of 
elites is not always linked to institutions. Rather, elites, in the presence of institutional voids, 
can invent, circumvent and corrupt institutions. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, elites, institutions, institutional theory, institutional voids, 
corruption.  
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1.0 Introduction 
In the last two decades, the institutional theory has contributed to a richer understanding of the 
behaviour and reactions of stakeholders to issues of corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Judge, Douglas & Kutan, 2008). It has stimulated research towards understanding the 
macro and micro institutional influences on corporate governance in varieties of capitalism 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima, 2013, Lien & Li, 2013). 
However, given the promising prospects of the institutionalism-based corporate governance 
discourse, its usefulness in explaining corporate governance, especially in weak institutional 
contexts, has suffered from an important limitation. This relates to the role of elites (see 
Domhoff, 1990; Vergara, 2013) in shaping corporate governance through their influences on 
institutional (e.g. regulatory) mechanisms.   
  
µ(OLWH¶ZDVXVHGLQWKHth century to describe items of particular excellence, but the usage has 
been extended to refer to superior social groups (Bottomore, 2006). Elites represent a small 
group of influential people that control a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege or power 
in society (Mills, 2000). Elites, in each sphere of activity, have succeeded or arrived at a higher 
echelon in the hierarchy (Aron, 1999). They include business (corporate) elites (Sikka, 2017), 
community elites, religious elites (Barro & McCleary, 2003), political elites (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980; Hadani, 2012) and professional elites (Aron, 1999). Essentially, elites have no restriction 
regarding their locale. They dictate the governance process in institutional settings, be it 
religious, military, academic, professions, community, or industry (Rizvi, 2015). In doing this, 
they use power and domination to influence the governance networks that promote institutional 
and organisational goals (Maclean, Harvey & Chia, 2010).  
 
The relationship between elites and institutions is important, given that elites influence 
institutions and vice versa (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Higley and Lengyel (2000) note that 
institutions limit elite unity or disunity, differentiation or circulation, but these elite groups, in 
turn, influence the operation of institutions and may be able to overwhelm existing institutional 
structures. On the one hand, Higley and Lengyel (2000) note that in stable democracies, 
institutions constrain elites strongly; however, in economies undergoing fundamental changes 
where institutions are typically in flux (deinstitutionalisation), elites possess wider latitudes of 
choice and action. On the other hand, multinational corporations are expected to accommodate 
operational dynamics that allow them to respond appropriately to local institutional demands. 
As a result, multinational firms who are subject to institutional control in their home country 
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may find the void of such control filled by elites in their host (developing) countries. Ahrens 
and Ferry (2015; 2016) show how elites (e.g. government agencies), using state machinery, can 
influence the perception of citizens and stakeholders. However, despite the vital role of elites, 
especially in weak institutional contexts, there is a limited research on them. This is because 
elites are, by their nature, difficult to penetrate (Hertz & Imber, 1995). They characteristically 
invent barriers that set their members apart from the rest of the society, resulting in µclass 
belongingness¶ (see Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016). Therefore, in this paper, we examine the 
relationship between elitist influences and the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for 
corporate governance in developing economies.  
 
The literature on corporate governance in developing countries has adopted an institutional 
perspective (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008), but what remains unknown is a clear identification 
of the shapers of corporate governance institutional effectiveness. The extant literature in this 
space (Lau et al. 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) has documented 
weaknesses in the business environments at both macro and micro levels. This literature has 
however paid limited attention to the relationship between institutions and elites (Zald & 
Lounsbury, 2010; Khan, 2012). We contribute to the literature on the institutional theory of 
corporate governance, by examining the role of elites, as institutional influencers, especially in 
developing economies. We rely on the notion RI ³institutional void´ to deepen our 
understanding of elitist influences. Institutional voids can provide opportunities for substitution 
by other institutional arrangements established by elites to influence institutional outcomes (see 
Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Sikka, 2017). As such, we investigate the extent to which 
institutional voids and elites have provided the conditions for the growing levels of corruption 
and poor corporate governance in weak institutional contexts. In doing this, we identify the 
instruments employed by elites in influencing corporate governance outcomes. Our research, 
therefore, seeks to address the question: 
 
To what extent is the corporate governance system in Nigeria a reflection of 
elitist influences?  
 
Nigeria, as a research context, presents an appropriate case study to understand how the main 
institutional factors of corporate governance respond to the influences of elites (Yakassai, 
2001; Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007). Apart from being a leading economy in Africa, it is at 
the forefront of corporate governance research in the continent, particularly regarding the 
institutional antecedents of good corporate governance (Adegbite, 2015). As most Anglophone 
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countries in Africa share similarities in their institutional environments (Tsamenyi & Uddin, 
2009), our findings provide relevant cross-country insights into the role of elites in corporate 
governance. We show how the institutional elements which permit a robust corporate 
governance system are frustrated by institutional voids that mirror elitist preferences. For 
example, we examine the herding power of religion to understand how under-researched 
religious elites influence corporate governance outcomes. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds with a literature review and the theoretical frame of the research 
study. Here, we focus on institutional theory and its elements mainly institutional environment, 
institutions and institutional voids to examine the role of elites in corporate governance. 
Following on, we present our research design and methodology as well as the analysis and 
discussion of our findings. We conclude with some contributions, implications for practice and 
areas for future research. 
 
2.0 Corporate Governance, Institutional Theory, Elites and Corruption 
Corporate governance denotes a system for directing and controlling companies (Cadbury, 
1992), assures finance suppliers to firms of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), and establishes a system of checks and balances (Solomon, 2013). The concept 
of corporate governance is deeply situated within the sphere of agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very (2007) however 
note that the agency theory relies on assumptions that reduce the complexity of the corporate 
governance phenomenon. Aguilera and Jackson (2003), for instance, argue that the agency 
theory fails to sufficiently explore how institutional embeddedness influence corporate 
governance.  Alternatively, institutional theory examines the deeper and more resilient aspects 
of social structure, investigating the processes by which certain structures become established 
as guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 2004). Institutional theory helps us to understand why 
and how organisations relate to their institutional environments (Suddaby, 2010). Institutional 
environments have become the anchor for understanding the institutional theory, with 
institutional theorists contending that the institutional environment, rather than market 
pressures, inspires the formal structures in an organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
In addition to the institutional environment, scholars have also studied institutional theory by 
exploring institutions.  Institutions, as enduring features of social life (Giddens, 1984), are any 
collectively accepted system of rules by which societies establish institutional beliefs (Searle, 
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2005).  They not only represent a system of established and accepted social rules that structure 
social interactions (Hodgson, 2006), but comprise elements that provide stability and meaning 
to social life (Scott, 2014). Thus, institutions not only possess the capacity to constrain or 
enable behaviour (North, 1990) but also exhibits a permanency characteristic, as a tool for 
building robust institutions (Dulbecco & Renard, 2003). On this understanding, institutional 
theory acknowledges that institutions are enduring entities (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), 
maintained over prolonged periods (Dacin & Dacin, 2008), and highly resistant to change 
(Zucker, 1987).  
 
Institutions can also mirror social problems, such as corruption (Omololu, 2007). Institutions 
may be corrupt giving rise to political or country risk (see Everett, Neu & Rahaman, 2007). 
This risk is prevalent in developing economies with considerable natural resources but weak 
regulation, thereby offering immense possibilities for corruption (Ferry, Zakaria, Zakaria & 
Slack, 2017). Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright (2000) note that it is easier to engage in 
corruption in environments that lack functional governance structures, independent checks and 
balances, transparent reporting standards, and efficient judicial systems. Osuagwu and 
Obumneke (2013) link the persistence of these problems to the activities of profit-seeking and 
corrupt political elites. In acknowledging the interaction between institutions and elites, the 
literature has demonstrated how one produces the other. For example, Jackson (2010) notes 
that as broader institutional environments influence the preferences of actors, institutions 
equally reflect the biases (e.g. corrupt leanings) of actors, thereby affirming the influence of 
elites on institutional outcomes. Mair and Marti, (2009) suggest that opportunity spaces in the 
institutional environment reinforce the influence of elites on institutions rather than the widely-
reported institutional weakness. These opportunity spaces represent institutional voids. 
 
Institutional voids represent situations where institutional arrangements that support markets 
are absent, weak, or incapable of achieving the expectations that prompted their establishment 
(Mair & Marti, 2009; Amaeshi, Adegbite & Rajwani, 2016). Unpredictable government 
regulations, the absence of specialist intermediaries, underdeveloped capital market, and weak 
contract-enforcing mechanisms characterise institutional voids (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Li 
& Qian, 2013). These voids obstruct the efficient functioning of markets thereby increasing the 
cost of transactions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The literature examining institutional voids have 
emphasised two areas. The first relates to the institutional environment that promotes 
institutional voids (Luiz & Stewart, 2014; Fainshmidt et al., 2016), whereas the second focuses 
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on the outcomes created by institutional voids (Wu, 2005; Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). The 
challenge posed by institutional voids in developing economies is receiving scholarly attention. 
For instance, Fainshmidt et al. (2016) note that African countries experience deep, persistent 
and substantial institutional voids (see also Amaeshi et al., 2016). The presence of institutional 
voids explain increasing corruption (Wu, 2005; Luiz and Stewart, 2014), and the lack of 
political accountability and stability (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012), among others. 
 
The opportunity spaces created by institutional voids further facilitate the emergence and 
strengthening of elites in response to institutional voids. Elites gain dominance in the 
environment of government corruption and weak enforcement of business laws (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000; Filatotchev et al. 2013). Elites can reinforce their influence as they engage their 
extensive networks to affect market involvement. This is consistent with a form of institutional 
void which impedes market participation, as identified in Mair and Marti (2009). For example, 
Neu et al. (2010) examined an IMF structural adjustment program and the role of accounting 
technologies and agents within that programme in the Nigerian banking sector. In reporting the 
presence of elitist power, they note that despite the potential disciplinary power of an 
DFFRXQWLQJV\VWHPWKDWµSRZHU¶LVLQHIIHFWXDOZKHQWKHREMHFWLYHVRIDQDFFRXQWLQJV\VWHPare 
inconsistent with the desire of elites (see also, Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016). This permits the 
expression of the outputs of institutional voids notably corruption. 
 
Corruption is an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a way that 
breaches the rules of the game such as in the illegal application of public resources and abuse 
of standard processes (Jain, 2001). The description in Jain (2001) suggests that corruption 
mostly finds expression in the public sector. This position is noted in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) and Ferry et al. (2016), rationalising that the structure of government institutions and 
that of the political process define the level of corruption. They posit that governments that fail 
to control their agencies experience high corruption levels. The preceding views are consistent 
with the notion of demand-side corruption. Wu (2005) argued that demand-side corruption 
(taker) resonates with government officials. The context of corruption is however 
complemented by its supply-side. Wu (2005) explained that supply-side (giver) corruption 
originates from the business (private) sector, as rent-seeking entrepreneurs seek to exploit 
political and other influences to their benefit. 
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The literature (Jain, 2001; Caron, Ficici, & Richter, 2012) reports a negative relationship 
between governance and corruption, indicating that corporate governance practices are 
frustrated in countries with high levels of corruption. Given the negative effects of corruption, 
DWWHPSWVKDYHEHHQPDGH WRH[DPLQH LWVPRWLYDWLRQV$LGW  UHO\LQJRQ-DLQ¶V 
view of corruption, articulates three conditions that trigger corruption. These include the 
possession of discretionary power, the extraction of economic rents and the existence of weak 
institutions. Ogbeidi (2012) (discretionary power), Tignor (1993) and Osoba (1996) (economic 
rents) and Adegbite and Nakajima (2011) (weak institutions) show that these conditions drive 
corruption in developing economies such as Nigeria. These elements not only combine to 
support each other but also provide the mechanism for institutional exploitations by elites.  
 
Neu, Everett and Rahaman (2013) also demonstrate how macro-level elite influences trickle 
downward and frame audit judgements, in a way which restricts auditors¶ ability to detect and 
report on potentially corrupt activities. They demonstrate how elite-led corrupt networks 
skilfully employ accounting practices and social interactions to enable corruption. In particular, 
the emergence of corporate elites has UHVXOWHGLQµPDQDJHULDOLVP¶ZKHUHWRSPDQDJHUVSRVVHVV
extensive powers to pursue their interests with the minimal constraint from shareholders (Davis, 
2005; Lozano, Martinez & Pindado, 2016; Sikka, 2017). This outcome bears sizable 
consequences for corporate governance as corporate elites face several attempts to promote 
corporate governance (Sariol & Abebe, 2017), stemming from the increasing power of 
stakeholders and greater board independence, amongst others. 
 
In understanding elitist influences, it is of particular importance to appreciate the cross-cultural 
distinctiveness of an institutional environment when considering how elites gain ascendancy 
to positions of power. This may imply a variance in the role of elites in different business 
contexts. The practice of corporate governance represents one of many structures that have 
been affected by the variations in the role of elites in different countries. This problem is more 
pronounced amongst developing economies such as Nigeria, where the challenges in the 
institutional environment have provided opportunities for increased elitist influence (Rizvi, 
2015). However, while the institutional theorising of corporate governance in Nigeria has 
gained momentum, limited attention has been paid to elitist influences. For example, Adegbite, 
Amaeshi and Nakajima (2013) examined the influences of three agents ± international 
organisations, rating agencies and local institutions - on corporate governance in Nigeria. 
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Oghojafor, George and Owoyemi (2012) focused on national culture and its implications for 
corporate governance. These studies adopt the conventional view of institutional theory which 
posits that institutions possess the capacity to check the behaviour of influencers such as elites. 
We contribute to the literature in this space by providing insights on the role of elites in shaping 
the institutional environment for corporate governance, in weak institutional settings. This is 
very important given the increasing doubts about the capacity of institutions to constrain 
unethical behaviours (Uche, Adegbite & Jones, 2016; Egbe, Adegbite & Yekini, 2017). We 
present our methodology next. 
 
3.0 Research Design and Methodology 
This paper adopts a qualitative, interpretivist research approach. According to Patton (2002, 
p.89), µWKHUH LVa very practical side to qualitative (research) methods that simply involves 
asking open-HQGHGTXHVWLRQVRISHRSOH«LQUHDO-world settings in order to VROYHSUREOHPV¶
Therefore, semi-structured interviews were carried out, whereby a series of questions were 
asked (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), allowing the interviewer to vary the sequence of the 
questions as deemed necessary (Bryman, 2015). This approach, which favours a two-way 
communication, offered more opportunities to ask probing questions in reaction to a significant 
response. As a result, information generated from our semi-structured interviews did not only 
provide answers but also offered explanations for those answers (Flick, 2014). This therefore 
aided the collection of in-depth and nuanced qualitative data (Denscombe, 2010, Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012). This approach is consistent with previous studies on 
corporate governance in Nigeria (see, e.g. Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016; Nakpodia, Adegbite, 
Amaeshi & Owolabi, 2016). The interviews were conducted by one of the authors over a two-
month period, with each interview lasting on average 40 minutes (see Appendix 1 for interview 
JXLGH´ 
 
Given the qualitative nature of this research, we engaged corporate governance stakeholders in 
Nigeria as participants in this study. Sampling was undertaken using the judgement technique 
(see Marshall, 1996), based on pre-determined characteristics (Corbetta, 2003) that include 
position held in the organisation, work experience, industry spread and an understanding of 
elites. Based on this strategy, we contacted participants with appropriate profile through emails 
and telephone calls. Considering Hofstede+RIVWHGHDQG0LQNRY¶VFXOWXUDOHYDOXDWLRQ
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of Nigeria as a collectivist society1, we used personal contacts and snowballing technique to 
access participants.2 To ensure that all participants satisfy our predetermined characteristics, 
we matched participants identified via snowballing to the pre-agreed interviewee features. We 
employed these strategies (personal contacts and snowballing) simultaneously to identify other 
suitable participants. As cultural issues impact the number of interviews conducted in 
qualitative studies (Marshall et al., 2013), these techniques proved beneficial in securing access 
to interviewees (Denscombe, 2010, Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012).  
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with elites who influence corporate governance 
outcomes in the country. Our understanding of elites relies on the descriptions in Aron (1999) 
and Mills (2000). They note that elites are a small number of influential people with significant 
societal power, and who occupy higher positions in the organisational hierarchy. In all, three 
VWDNHKROGHUJURXSVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKLVVWXG\QDPHO\FRUSRUDWHH[HFXWLYHVGHVLJQDWHGDVµ(¶
regulators (noted DVµ5¶DQGFRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFHFRQVXOWDQWVODEHOOHGDVµ&¶7KHSRVLWLRQ
experience and knowledge of corporate governance issues of these participants were central to 
their participation in this study. These characteristics, in addition to their relationship with elites 
in different spheres of the country, were central to their selection as participants. This study 
involves executives from various corporate organisations listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). These elites (Bakre, 2007; O'Shannassy & Leenders, 2016) not only retain 
influence in their corporations but also in the industry.  
 
The sample selection follows two consecutive VWDJHV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶VHOHFWLRQLQLWLDOO\UHOLHGRQ
their knowledge of corporate governance, and after that, their position in the organisation.  
Among Nigerian companies, corporate governance decisions are the preserve of top board 
executives. These executives, given their positions and influence in their organisations, qualify 
as corporate elites (Sikka, 2017). This is consistent with prior research (Daguerre, 2013; 
Cardenas, 2016), where top executives were employed to investigate corporate elitist 
influences. It is worthy to note that corporate elites in Nigeria have extended their operating 
                                                          
1Collectivism indicates a preference for a tightly knit framework in society wherein individuals expect their 
relatives or group members to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede et al, 2010).  
2
 The problem in penetrating elites (see Hertz & Imber, 1995) given the extent of power distance meant it was 
challenging accessing data respondents. The use of snowballing helped in minimising the effect of this 
limitation. Also, the sensitive nature of the research focus resulted in postponements and cancellations of 
scheduled interviews. 
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locale. Increased involvement in politics, religion, and traditional institutions (see Hadani, 
2012; Rivzi, 2015), among others, have reinforced their relevance.  
 
The next set of participants, i.e. corporate governance regulators, are director-level employees 
in the principal corporate governance regulatory institutions in the country. These include the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Commission (NDIC), and the NSE. The final class of participants were 
consultants (see also Adegbite, 2015), many of whom have previously held executive positions 
in publicly listed companies. This group provided perspectives on how elites take advantage 
of institutional voids to achieve their desired outcomes. The selection of these three categories 
of participants was influenced by two factors. First, the corporate governance literature in 
Nigeria has benefitted from the inputs of these three categories of participants (see Nakpodia 
et al., 2016). Second, the desire to generate broad and rich data demands the engagement of 
wider stakeholder groups. Table 1 presents the profiles of the participants. 
 
Table 1: Profile of Participants 
 
Stakeholder Group 
Career Background Total 
Law Finance/Accounting Economics Others Participants % 
Corporate Executives 2 6 3 3 14 43 
Regulators 3 4 1 3 11 33 
Consultants 2 3 0 3 8 24 
Total 7 13 4 9 33 100 
 
As part of our sampling strategy, the engagement of an appropriate number of participants is 
central to achieving our research objectives (Marshall et al., 2013). However, Mason (2010) 
maintained that the guiding principle for sample size in qualitative studies should be the 
concept of saturation. This demands that researchers should satisfy themselves that they have 
learned, and understood the phenomenon to sufficiently create knowledge. This was the 
primary factor in determining an appropriate sample size in this research. Thus, in this study, 
we conducted 33 interviews, with 21 of these interviews tape-recorded. Uche, et al. (2016) note 
that it is culturally challenging to record interviews in Nigeria owing to trust concerns. This 
lack of trust by participants meant that 12 interviews were not tape-recorded. The interviewer 
however made handwritten notes to capture key responses provided during the interviews. 
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The data for this study was analysed utilising the qualitative content analysis (QCA) technique, 
which allowed the interpretation of our transcribed textual data using a systematic classification 
process of coding and detecting themes or patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Unlike the 
conventional (quantitative) content analysis, Schreier (2012) asserts that QCA is not 
constrained to frequency counts. Rather, as Mayring (2000) emphasises, it offers an 
opportunity to explore core themes. These features, in addition to its significant connection to 
interpretivist features (Flick, 2014) were central to its use in this study. This research employs 
the procedure in Elo & Kyngäs (2008) to explore, classify and understand the data collected.  
 
The first stage of our data analysis involved generating sub-categories from an open coding 
process. This stage ensured that key terms from the transcribed interviews were classified into 
much smaller content categories (Weber, 1990) to generate themes. The themes in the sub-
categories represent the views of participants regarding corporate governance institutions in 
Nigeria, as influenced by various forms of elitist interventions. These subcategories, following 
the second stage of analysis, produced the generic categories. The generic categories assisted 
in reducing the number of sub-categories by collapsing those that are similar or dissimilar into 
broader higher order categories (Dey, 2003). The final stage of our data analysis, i.e. the 
abstraction stage, helped in generating answers to the research problem (Polit & Beck, 2012). 
This stage produced the main FDWHJRU\WKDWDGGUHVVHVWKHVWXG\¶VUHVHDUFKinquiry, i.e. elitist 
influences on the institutional environment for corporate governance in Nigeria. We analysed 
data with the aid of NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software. This software assisted the 
generation of nodes (codes) which we compared to manually generated codes for consistency. 
The NVivo software not only enabled effective data management (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013) 
EXWZDVDOVRKHOSIXOLQWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRUJDQLVLQJDQGUHSRUWLQJRIWKHVWXG\¶VILQGLQJV 
 
4.0 Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
Our data show that the institutional mechanisms for corporate governance in Nigeria reflect the 
preferences of three interrelated groups of elites, i.e. political, cultural and religious elites (see 
Figure 1). In this section, we analyse and discuss these findings, paying attention to the 
mechanisms employed by the elites, and using supporting extracts from our anonymised data 
(E1-E14; R1-R11; C1-C8). 
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Figure 1: Thematic Framework for Findings 
Political Influence
Political Authority
Political Immunity
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Leaders
Elitist Preferences as 
Drivers of 
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Corporate Governance
Main Category
Generic Categories
Sub-Categories
 
 
 
4.1 Political Elites and Corporate Governance      
Data respondents acknowledge the link between corporate governance practice and political 
elites. Political elites are highly-placed political office holders (Higley and Lengyel, 2000). Our 
data reveal that political elites use three main influencers to retain influence on corporate 
governance institutions. These are political influence, political authority and political immunity. 
Political influence involves the interactions of various stakeholders who possess limited 
control over the rewards of political actors (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980). This suggests that political 
influence relates to influences on political decision making. Its effects are evident among 
Nigerian businesses. For instance, E4 noted that; 
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From my experience in the industry, the sort of influence that political office holders 
wield in publicly-listed companies is not healthy for the business or economic 
environment.  
While E4 affirms that political influence is apparent in the business environment, the discharge 
of that influence by political elites is a source of concern. E11 also notes that; 
«RXUSROLWLFDOV\VWHP«LVWKHGULYHURI«RXUSUREOHPV7DNHSROLWLFDORIILFHKROGHUV
(for example); there are instances where politicians influence board composition of 
some corporations...This undermines the principles of corporate governance.   
Comments from other respondents (R4, E5 and E7) illustrates that this is a concern prevalent 
among political elites. The ability of political leaders to influence organisational choices rely 
on the control they wield over organisational outcomes (Nahavandi, 2006), such as in the award 
of government contracts. The implication for corporate governance is that the possession of 
such influence by political elites overwhelms the capacity of corporate governance institutions 
to effectively monitor behaviour (Dahan, Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Our data reveal that the 
possession of political influence by politicians is permitted by weak legal institutions, unlimited 
power, greed, societal expectations, poverty, illiteracy, and notably, the desire to preserve their 
VRFLDO VWDWXV 7KHVH HOHPHQWV DUH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH µRSSRUWXQLW\ VSDFHV¶ FUHDWHG E\
institutional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009). R5 opined that:  
3ROLWLFLDQV¶GHVLUHWROLYHXSWRWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIIULHQGVDQGFURQLHV2QFHyou are a 
top politician, some public status is bestowed on you7KHQH[WWKLQJLVWR«SUHVHUYH
that status. Preserving that status involves engaging in (unethical) activities that 
conflict with corporate governance.     
Whereas the desire to maintain a privileged public status may not be a problem in itself, the 
means of achieving and maintaining the status is often inconsistent with good corporate 
governance principles. Our data suggest that politicians collaborate with corporations to engage 
in unethical and fraudulent practices to enhance their public status (Schuchter & Levi, 2015). 
The inability of citizens to scrutinise politicians (see Aplin & Hegarty, 1980) accelerates their 
political influence, which subsequently produces unrestricted political authority.  
Cassinelli (1961) noted that political authority relates to ordering, regulating, shaping, and 
determining the behaviour of human beings. These features of political authority connote 
FRQWURORILQGLYLGXDOV:KLOHWHUPVVXFKDVµVKDSLQJ¶RUµdetermining¶FDQEHYLHZHGSRVLWLYHO\
ZRUGVVXFKDVµRUGHULQJ¶DQGµUHJXODWLQJ¶LPSO\DGHVLUHWRFRPSHOEHKDYLRXU+HQFHSROLWLFDO
authority remains a primary concern for corporate governance. In Nigeria, for instance, Ogbeidi 
(2012) noted that political authority LV XVXDOO\ H[HUFLVHG QRW QHFHVVDULO\ IRU VWDNHKROGHUV¶
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benefit, but for the personal financial benefits of politicians. This fact is corroborated in 
Otusanya et al. (2016) who argued that political corruption amongst legislators in Nigeria is 
exacerbated by the inability of regulators to apply sanctions effectively. The implication, as 
noted in Domadenik, 3UDãQLNDUDQG6YHMQDU(2016), is that developing democracies that lack 
the will to punish political corruption provide opportunity spaces for maximising political 
connectedness. E1 notes; 
,QWKLVFRXQWU\SRVVHVVLRQRISROLWLFDODXWKRULW\FRPHVZLWK«EHQHILWV7KHSROLWLFLDQV 
are very rich, but you cannot identify the source of their wealth.  
Regarding the above, R3, also noted that; 
Our politicians enjoy the unlimited capacity to impose obligations on the people.  There 
are virtually no opportunities for the citizens to question the authority of these 
politicians, especially their infractions in the area of public and corporate governance. 
These comments highlight the fact that political elites engage their authority to entrench their 
corrupt activities (Sikka, 2017). The comments also underline the challenge encountered by 
regulators when investigating the corporate governance infractions committed by politicians. 
The political system limits the capacity of regulators to prosecute political elites (Otusanya et 
al., 2016). Indeed, the prospect of evading prosecution encourages the pursuit of political 
authority. While the influences and powers of political elites are aided by weaknesses in legal 
institutions (Adegbite, 2012; Ferry et al., 2017), this development has had implications for the 
legitimacy of political institutions. E9 stated that: 
You see the way political leaders parade themselves and show off their wealth. They do 
this to oppress the people and remind us of their public status. (Hence) these politicians 
and the entire political system that brought them to power are not respected. 
Legitimacy concerns, in the political domain, emerge when there are inconsistencies in the 
expectation of leaders and the followers thereby creating a lack of trust. As E9 notes, there is 
a misuse by politicians, of the authority which their positions confer on them to derive private 
benefits from the corporate sector. The effect on corporate governance is that policies from the 
government also lack legitimacy. Coglianese (2007) observed that corporate governance is 
becoming structured more akin to governments in certain ways. This suggests that whereas a 
well-run government might produce a good corporate governance system, governments lacking 
legitimacy may hinder the same. This challenge is worsened by the provision of immunity 
FODXVHVLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VFRQstitution. 
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Political immunity means that certain politicians (the President, Vice-President, Governors and 
Deputy Governors) are not accountable for their misdemeanour while in office. Consequently, 
interviewees identified political immunity as another area which politicians have succeeded in 
manipulating to their advantage. Corporate governance challenges, they claim, have been 
heighteQHG E\ WKH µOHJDOLVHG LPPXQLW\¶ ZKLFK SROLWLFLDQV can access. This immunity is 
entrenched in Section 308 (Subsection 1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The use (and abuse) 
of immunity clause is widespread in countries such as Nigeria (Markovska & Adams, 2015). 
,PPXQLW\µSRZHUV¶indicate that political elites are not held accountable for their actions. On 
the expiration of their tenure, politicians may face prosecution, but as Markovska and Adams 
(2015) REVHUYHGWKHLPPXQLW\FODXVHJLYHVSROLWLFDORIILFHKROGHUVHQRXJKWLPHWRµFOHDQXS
WKHLUDFWV¶ZKLOHLQRIILFH7KLVV\VWHPRISURWHFWLRQLVP(Markovska & Adams, 2015) ensures 
that politicians appoint individuals who are sympathetic to their cause. Thus, at the completion 
of their tenure, these appointees work for them and conceal their acts. This underscores how 
political immunity reinforces the influence and authority wielded by political elites on 
corporations. As Adegbite et al. (2012) noted, the Nigerian political system reflects its high 
incidence of corruption, given that Nigeria has typically lacked the institutional capacity to 
tackle political corruption. They further noted that politicians continuously seek financial 
support from corporations. This reinforces public±private corruption (supply and demand-side 
corruption), and it is within this climate that corporate governance finds expression.  
 
In line with the aforementioned, Wu (2005) affirmed that the political environment in a country 
determines the extent to which key political actors can influence policy outcomes. This 
influence can be extended to create another form of immunity, i.e. the implied immunity, which 
manifests when immunity extends beyond politicians. This happens when political elites 
influence corporate governance, by having their family members, FURQLHV2¶6XOOLYDQ
and political bagmen (i.e. individuals that collect financial contributions from businesses on 
behalf of politicians) (see Neu et al., 2013) appointed to corporate boards. Their cronies, 
representatives, relations and political bagmen are immune from prosecution, as they take 
advantage of their relationship with political elites. This escalates the challenges confronting 
the functionality of corporate governance institutions and promotes undesired isomorphic 
tendencies in the institutional environment. Such isomorphic characteristics strengthen the 
influence and authority of political elites and provide a system for entrenching political 
immunity. C1 acknowledges this concern; 
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What type of corporate governance do you expect when some people cannot be held 
DFFRXQWDEOH IRU WKHLU LOOHJDO DFWV EHFDXVH RI WKH SRVLWLRQ WKH\ KROG" «SROLWLFDO
immunity does not connect with (the ideas of) corporate governance.  
 
4.2 Cultural/Traditional Elites and Corporate Governance 
In the institutionalism-based corporate governance literature, evidence (Haniffa & Cooke 2002, 
Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, 2005) indicate that culture influences corporate governance. 
Similar conclusions are reported in Nigeria. Oghojafor et al. (2012), for instance, described the 
relationship between corporate governance and national culture as µ6LDPHVHWZLQV.¶ Similarly, 
the majority of the participants also agreed that culture has significant implications for 
corporate governance in Nigeria. For example, C3 stated that µ\RXFDQQRWVHSDUDWHSHRSOHIURP
their culture¶ while R1 noted that µFXOWXUH «SOD\V D YHU\ VLJQLILFDQW UROH LQ DOO WKDW ZH
1LJHULDQVGR¶ Related to the effect of culture on corporate governance, is the influence of 
cultural elites comprising of traditional rulers, community elders and other cultural leaders. As 
with political elites, our data shows that cultural elites rely on three factors to influence 
corporate governance institutions. These are social status inequality, respect for age and 
submissiveness to authority. 
 
On social status inequality, the preservation of social status is crucial to Nigerians. Ikoku (2013) 
admitted that in the Nigerian society, there is an opportunistic assertion that individuals are not 
HTXDO$VDUHVXOWVXERUGLQDWHVH[SHFWWREHµWROGZKDWWRGR¶ZKLOHWKHERVVLVSHUPLWWHGWR
exhibit autocratic behaviours. This LVGHVFULEHGDVµDVFULSWLRQ¶LQ7URPSHQQDUV and Hampden-
Turner (2004) culture framework, suggesting that in such societies, power, title and position 
PDWWHUDQGWKHVHµSULYLOHJHV¶GHILQHEHKDYLRXU7KHVHprivileges facilitate institutional voids 
that allow for corruption (Sikka, 2017). Furthermore, it provides the incentive for reconfiguring 
existing (corrupt) networks towards the desired goal (Neu et al., 2013). This is because those 
that possess these privileges acquire added capacity to act with less restraint, compared to those 
without them. Thus, the possession of these privileges enhances social status. E3 notes that; 
«ZKHQLQGLYLGXDOVVXJJHVWWKDWILQJHUVDUHQRWHTXDO, they (imply) that human beings 
are not equal. Unfortunately, that perception influences their action.  
C2 also stated that; 
«7UDGLWLRQDOUXOHUVVHHWKHPVHOYHVDVGLUHFWGHVFHQGDQWVRIWKHsupreme God. Their 
actions reflect this understanding. Even when they are involved in (corporate) 
relationships, they expect that same privilege. 
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The above comment denotes social status inequality, i.e. recognising the authority and power 
of certain people relative to the rest of society. In contrast, corporate governance demands that 
stakeholders be treated fairly and equitably.  However, the problem with this notion, as noted 
in Omololu (2007), is that legal concepts such as the rule of law are redefined to accommodate 
the excesses of the privileged few, owing to weak enforcement of laws (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000). This LVDOVRHYLGHQWLQ5¶VFRPPHQW 
The quality of corporate governance in a country is determined by the efficacy of (its 
regulation). However, in a country where rules are obeyed by the less-privileged 
EXW «IORXWHG E\ WKH rich and well-connected, this would affect the corporate 
governance system.  
The contribution by R2 reinforces the centrality of the regulatory/legal system to the emergence 
of a robust corporate governance framework. The effectiveness of existing regulation not only 
impacts corporate governance but acts to regulate the behaviour of important stakeholders 
(North, 1990). Neu et al. (2013) noted that the relatively low rate of corruption in developed 
economies ties with the robustness inherent in the institutions operating in countries that had 
created an effective reward-punishment mechanism. However, good corporate governance is 
impaired in contexts where existing regulations are subject to various interpretations based on 
social status (wealth, political affinity). 
 
7KHVRFLDOVWDWXVLQHTXDOLW\SUREOHPLVH[DFHUEDWHGE\µrespect for age. On this, respondents 
noted that another explanation for the undesirable impact of culture on corporate governance 
stems from the respect accorded elderly stakeholders (e.g. executives) in corporate 
environments. Consequently, their actions and inactions are usually not questioned, in 
observance of implied cultural beliefs. E9 noted this view; 
I have witnessed a board meeting where there was palpable respect for elders on the 
board. It was evident that some executives were conscious of the age of other executives 
KHQFHWKH\FRXOGQRWTXHVWLRQFRPPHQWVIURPWKHµHOGHUV¶ 
This belief system is prevalent in both public and private entities in Nigeria. R1 agrees that 
µRXUFXOWXUHUHTXLUHVWKDWZHUHVSHFWHOGHUV¶ hence an attempt to question an older executive, 
IRU LQVWDQFH E\ D \RXQJHU SHUVRQ LV GHHPHG µGLVUHVSHFWIXO¶ :KLOH WKLV UHLQIRUFHV SRZHU
distance (see Hofstede et al. 2010), Conton (1964) reported that this problem is prevalent in 
many African countries, where they have much respect for age, such that, the older you are, 
the more respect you earn. This attitude increases the possibility of exempting older people 
from liabilities and penalties. To further highlight the relevance of age, an Ibo (one of the three 
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largest ethnic groups in Nigeria) adage claims that µSD\LQJDWWHQWLRQDQGOLVWHQLQJWRDQHOGHUO\
SHUVRQLVOLNHFRQVXOWLQJDQRUDFOH¶ While this equates an older adult to an Oracle (god), it 
stresses the cultural challenges in confronting an elderly executive when infractions are 
apparent. E5 admits this concern; 
As an executive, there is the tendency to be mindful of age when relating with people in 
many corporate boards in (Nigeria). Often, older people, by their age, bring undue 
pressure on younger (colleagues) thereby restricting their objectivity in (corporate) 
decision making. 
(¶VDFFRXQWVXJJHVWVWKDWFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHLQ1LJHULDUHVSRQGVWRWKHGRPLQDQWFXOWXUDO
paradigm in many parts of the country. In Nigeria, the elderly are highly respected and 
perceived as a leader. The preceding explains why prior research suggests the preference for 
older directors on corporate boards in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015).  
 
Notwithstanding the respect accorded to age in the Nigerian society, individuals with power 
and authority attract similar esteem. As such, the third influence linked to cultural elites is 
submissiveness to power and authority. E8 remarked that; 
«:HGHIHUWRDXWKRULW\)RULQVWDQFHLIyou have a traditional ruler as the chairman 
of a Board, would you argue with him? 
The connection which E8 established between corporate executives and traditional rulers offer 
an intriguing proposition. As traditional rulers were historically known to oversee activities in 
their local domain, their engagement by the British during the colonial era reinforced their 
societal relevance.3 E3 observed that traditional rulers are regarded as gods in their domain 
hence their decisions or authority are not usually questionable. Their authority is evident in the 
SROLWLFDO HQYLURQPHQW 7KH µHVWHHP¶ DFFRUGHG WR WUDGLWLRQDO rulers inform their engagement 
across different economic spheres. For instance, some serve as chairmen of corporate boards, 
while virtually all universities in Nigeria appoint traditional rulers as chancellors. Regardless 
of these assignments, their status as traditional rulers attracts reverence, even when they err. 
E3 illustrates the effect on corporate governance; 
«ZKHQWKDWPHQWDOLW\is brought into a corporate setting, the chairman or the CEO can 
have a superiority complex or even a god-complex, such that the person is unable 
                                                          
3
 British colonialists introduced the indirect rule system, which had traditional rulers at its foundation. 
Traditional rulers acquire their status through succession hence their authority is often rooted in traditions and 
customs 
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WR «REH\ FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH FRGHV because, as the CEO or chairman, he sees 
himself as a god. 
The effect of this development was noted in Warren (1996), asserting that authority compels a 
surrender of judgement by those subject to that authority. However, given 6RORPRQ¶V(2013) 
description of corporate governance as a checks and balance mechanism, the effect of the 
misapplication of authority in Nigeria on corporate governance is problematic. 
 
4.3 Religious Elites and Corporate Governance 
$V VKRZQ LQ )LJXUH  D JHQHULF FDWHJRU\ WKDW HPHUJHG IURP WKH FRGLQJ RI SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
responses is the increasing influence of religious leaders. Despite the limited literature 
examining the impact of religion on corporate governance, Barro and McCleary (2003) and 
McCleary (2008) contend that religion is essential to economic development. This is consistent 
with KePSI-U¶VREVHUYDWLRQ, noting that religious factors may contribute to the success 
(or otherwise) of corporate governance. However, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) note 
that much of the existing evidence regarding the impact of religion builds on cross-country 
studies wherein the impact is affected by variations in institutional contexts.  
 
The lack of attention to religious elites in the institutional theory scholarship is because 
developed economies provide the studied settings. Findings in Norris and Inglehart (2011) 
reveal a decrease in the religiosity index between 1947 and 2001 in many developed economies; 
hence the generality of literature has considerably neglected the role of religious elites in those 
climes. Norris and Inglehart (2011) added that following the economic buoyancy in developed 
countries, the religiosity of its citizens has dipped. Kuran (2009) and Stastna (2013) suggested 
that people overlook religion as they become wealthy. In contrast, many developing countries 
are looking to religion for hopes of economic emancipation. Adi (2005), for example, stated 
that the belief in the supernatural or spiritual realities is central to the worldview of Nigerians. 
Adamo (2001) added that the richest and the most important heritage of Africa is religion, as 
it permeates the entire life of the African people, shaping their cultural, social, political and 
economic activities.  The views by Adamo (2001) and Adi (2005) have stimulated the 
emergence of religious elites in Nigeria. 
 
Countries with a dominant religion (e.g. Saudi Arabia) are likely to have many of their policies 
influenced by religion. Thus, when E2 comments that religion is crucial to societies, such 
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DVVHUWLRQVDUHLQIRUPHGE\SUDFWLFHVLQWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VHQYLURQPHQW. This reasoning informed 
WKH JHQHUDOLW\ RI SDUWLFLSDQW¶V UHVSRQVHV 7KHUH DUH three main influencers, also used by 
religious elites to retain influence on corporate governance. These are the relevance of religion, 
religious impact and belief, and lastly, religious herding. With regards to the relevance of 
religion, most participants agreed that religion is crucial to corporate governance in Nigeria. 
They note that religious principles link with corporate governance practice E9 explains that; 
«UHOLJLRQ plays a significant role (in corporate governance). Religion preaches 
fairness, ethics and (...). Corporate governance is an offshoot of what religion 
(emphasises).  
As religion plays a significant role in the country, Nigeria is witnessing an increasing influence 
of religious leaders in corporate governance. This has further enhanced the public profiling of 
religious organisations and their leaders. In supporting E9 above, R3 notes that; 
In this country, the issue of religion is fundamental (to) every area of our lives. In 
politics, in business. Many (religious leaders) are aware of this. Some (religious leaders) 
take undue advantage of this opportunity. 
,QWKHFRQWH[WRI(DQG5¶VFRPPHQWVLWLVDSSURSULDWHWRH[SHFWWKDWWKHYDOXHVDVVRciated 
with religion should spur the emergence of a robust corporate governance system. Grullon, 
Kanatas and Weston (2009) agreed that religion should provide a developmental path for 
corporate governance in developing economies. However, this expectation is challenged by 
religious elites as noted by R3. While there are indications that devotees seek to model their 
behaviour in line with those of their leaders (Abioje, 2005), it raises questions regarding how 
religious impact and belief system affect corporate governance. Mainly, how do the principles 
of religion such as ethics and morality promote corporate governance in Nigeria? In addressing 
this question, E6 noted that; 
Religion preaches fairness and ethics... To my understanding, this is what corporate 
governance typifies. The (principles of) religion affects corporate governance 
positively.   
 
Similarly, C3 also stated that; 
Every religion is guided by the golden rule which is doing unto others what you expect 
them to do to you. Corporate governance is about aligning the interests of one party to 
those of another party. 
The responses of E6 and C3 indicate a positive relationship between religion and corporate 
governance, as their comments imply that the underlying drivers of religion can facilitate the 
emergence of a robust corporate governance. These reactions are important to corporate 
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governance in Nigeria, given the growing popularity of religion in the country, as highlighted 
by C1; 
«ZHDUHYHU\UHOLJLRXVLQWKLVFRXQWU\6RPHRIWKHFKXUFKHVDQGWKHPRVTXHVDUHYHU\
strong. They have much impact on the people. 
 
The above comment is UHIOHFWHG LQ SDUWLFLSDQW¶V UHOLJLRXV DIILOLDWLRQV DV WKH\ DUH HLWKHU
Christians or Muslims. However, while the majority of participants suggest that religion 
impacts governance, a minority of the participants argued that religion does not influence 
corporate governance practice in Nigeria. R1, for example, commented that;  
I do not think so because the rules are clear. The code is explicitly clear, so religion 
does not necessarily have any input in determining the extent of compliance with 
corporate governance codes. 
On 5¶V YLHZ Kuran (2009) takes a similar position but acknowledges that country 
specificities could compel different outcomes (see also, Guiso et al., 2003, Grullon et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, the majority of respondents highlighted instances where religious leaders exerted 
undue influence in shaping corporate governance outcomes, including board appointments, 
corporate investment decisions, amongst others. E7 notes; 
Religious leaders have an influence on their followers, including board members, 
which does filter into boardroom decisions. 
 
The last factor used by religious elites is religious herding. The influence and power of 
religious leaders are significant factors that have stimulated the surge in religiosity among 
Nigerians. 85% of Nigerians trust their religious leaders and would be willing to give them 
more power (Ferrett, 2005). Indeed, there is an increasing relationship between religious and 
political elites, with politicians enlisting the support of religious leaders in accessing devotees 
(electorates). This relationship has attracted criticism because it fosters corruption. While 
Sampson (2014) argued that the patronage of religion by politicians is a tool for propaganda 
and political advantage, Markovska and Adams (2015) state that corrupt elites engage religion 
to incite the poor and illiterate masses (devotees) to achieve their selfish religious and political 
ambitions. The association with politicians have provided opportunities for religious leaders to 
take advantage of institutional voids such as failure to comply with government policies (see 
Ferrett, 2005). Moreover, as leaders, they have employed various approaches to shape the 
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consciousness of Nigerians, thereby strengthening their growing relevance. R4 states that this 
growing influence has meant that; 
Religious leaders have become almost infallible. Whatever they say has to be the rule 
without question. In fact, many people have lost their rationality. They do not question 
their (religious leaders). They honour the words of their religious leaders more than 
the laws of the land. 
The reverence accorded to religious leaders in Nigeria has helped them secure privileged 
economic positions with access to significant financial resources, which strengthens their 
societal profile. C1 admits the considerable financial resources of religious leaders; 
You know, (some of) our religious leaders are amongst the richest in the world. Some 
own private jets. One of the best universities in the country today is owned by a 
(religious leader). Many of them hold directorships in listed companies with substantial 
shareholding. Their political relevance is on the increase. In fact, any serious political 
aspirant must visit them before elections, to obtain the votes of (devotees). 
The above comment by C1 highlights a significant concern, i.e. a herd mentality. Abioje (2005) 
stated that many Nigerians are conditioned by what they learn from their religious leaders. The 
implication for corporate governance is that as these leaders (or their devotees) occupy 
executive positions in Nigerian corporations, the companies, in the long run, reflect the 
preferences of these religious elites. This ZDVHYLGHQWLQ5¶VFRPPHQW 
You have some religious leaders that are chairmen of organisations in this country. 
Some others are appointed to corporate boards. When you consider the unethical 
practices that some (religious organisations) are accused of, you wonder how their 
leaders will discharge their responsibilities in a corporate environment. 
 
This practice gradually becomes a societal norm as the lure of religion intensifies. Participants 
also affirm that the current poverty level in the country had reinforced the herd mentality and 
boosted the rise in the influence of religious elites. C3 observed that religious leaders 
understand that poverty and economic deprivation stimulates the search for religious 
empowerment. Consequently, these leaders have become a beacon of hope for devotees, and 
also, a possible avenue for economic liberation. R4 shared these concerns; 
I think the poor economic environment has allowed religion to thrive such that religious 
OHDGHUV KDYH EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ VLJQLILFDQW LQ RXU VRFLDO OLYHV « 1RQ-existent 
checks and balances ensure that corporate governance remains weak, especially in 
organisations where religious leaders are in charge. 
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While most interviewees reported concerns in the conduct of religious elites, Abioje (2005) 
equally questioned the morality and ethical stance of religious leaders, stating that they exert 
negative influences on their devotees. Sampson (2014) also informed that religion has not 
generated the puritanical disposition or abhorrence for unjust behaviour among adherents that 
would have served as a basis for good corporate governance. Therefore, over time, devotees 
begin to exhibit similar traits as their leaders thus institutionalising the herd behaviour. This 
behaviour subsequently produces a group conduct that is inconsistent with the accountability 
principles underpinning corporate governance (see Abioje, 2005, 2011). 
 
 
5.0 Further Discussions  
Our analysis highlights the difficulty in restricting elitist influences on institutions in Nigeria 
to a specific elite group. Various elitist groups influences institutions (see Higley & Lengyel, 
2000; Rizvi, 2015) directly or indirectly. For instance, while the activities of religious and 
cultural elites are felt more in the social (cultural and religious) domain, the peculiarity of the 
institutional environment in Nigeria (given its low economic development) indicates that 
corporations reflect the dominant traits in the society (Bottomore, 2006; Cardenas, 2016). This 
shows how elites interrelate to reinforce their influence on social and corporate institutions 
(Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016). For example, our data suggested that religious leaders not only 
command attention in their religious domains but can assume executive positions in companies. 
Their recruitment to executive positions is sponsored by their devotees, who are often corporate 
elites. It is noteworthy that the distinctiveness of the researched context has highlighted elites 
(traditional and religious) whose influence is as important as those of entrepreneurs. 
 
However, unlike traditional and religious elites, our data indicate that political elitism in 
Nigeria bears considerable influences that overwhelm those of other elitist groups. The locus 
of opportunity space accessible by political elites is extensive given the (mis)conceptions 
regarding democracy and economic development (Ferry et al., 2017). The manipulation of state 
machinery is largely possible by politicians. Inyang (2009) suggested that the state of 
institutions reflects government (mostly politicians) preferences. Indeed, the little or no 
attention paid to the strengthening of institutional elements is intended to pave the way for 
institutional voids, which permit the perpetuation of corruption by elites. The overwhelming 
influence of political elites explains the democratic approach in Nigeria. For instance, while 
the appointment of traditional rulers (i.e. cultural elites) is the preserve of residents in the local 
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communities, their appointment must be ratified by political office holders. This institutional 
void weakens checks and balances, enhances the political authority and political influence as 
revealed by our data. More importantly, it undermines WKHµFRQWUROV¶DJDLQVWSROLWLFDOFRUUXSWLRQ 
(Wu, 2005).   
 
Warren (2003) noted that political and social elements are becoming increasingly influential 
than economic forces in shaping corporate behaviour. Forbes and Watson (1993) and 
Woodward, Edwards and Birkin (2001) also acknowledged that corporate executives attempt 
WR µVHW WKHDJHQGD¶ to manipulate societal opinion to secure a favourable view of corporate 
activity. As a result, the distinction between social institutions and corporate governance 
institutions is weak as both sets of institutions not only react to but aim to satisfy the preferences 
of the same elitist groups. In fact, a review of the challenges confronting corporate governance 
in Nigeria by Adegbite and Nakajima (2011) pointed at underlying weak social institutions. 
Udama (2013) and Okafor (2013) also argued that the pervasive corruption in the Nigerian 
social sphere not only has an adverse impact on the political system but has equally stimulated 
corporate corruption. 
 
Furthermore, the literature has identified the existence of a symbiotic relationship between 
elites and institutions (Ferry et al., 2017). Higley and Lenygel (2000), for example, noted that 
elites shape institutions, but institutional mechanisms influence how elites compete and emerge. 
Our study, however, presents a different view, i.e. the emergence of elites is not necessarily 
linked to institutions. Elites can, however, invent institutional voids that may be perceived or 
PLVXQGHUVWRRGE\VWDNHKROGHUVDVWKHµQHZLQVWLWXWLRQV¶. In developed economies, for instance, 
institutions are robust such that the demise of an elite does not result in the disappearance of 
that institution. In contrast, social institutions in weak institutional contexts typically reflect the 
preferences of an elitist group such that the death of a member of that group can upset the 
continued relevance of that institution. Rahaman, Everett and Neu (2007) establish how the 
instrumentality of accounting (a possible proxy for the institutional element) was overwhelmed 
by elitist biases. This informs why it is possible for firms in developed economies to exist over 
the long-term whereas such longevity is a rarity in developing economies. Similar examples 
are evident in traditional and religious institutions.   
 
The preceding discussions further reinforce the view that elitist influence bears significant 
implications for the permanency characteristic of institutions (Dulbecco & Renard, 2003, Dacin 
25 
 
& Dacin, 2008). In recognition of these issues, institutional theorising has benefitted from 
deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992, Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Deinstitutionalisation, according 
to Oliver (1992), denotes the erosion or discontinuation of an institutionalised organisational 
activity or practice. It entails the process wherein institutions become weak and subsequently 
disappear (Scott, 2004), or rejected and later abandoned (Dacin & Dacin, 2008). This 
possibility emphasises the importance of acknowledging the broader context of institutions, as 
the weakening and subsequent disappearance of a set of beliefs are likely to stimulate the arrival 
of new ones (Gilmore & Sillince, 2014). Our study suggests that elites impact the process of 
institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation (see also Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). This 
indicates that institutional permanence is shaped by elites, particularly in weak business 
environments.  
 
6.0. Contributions 
The extant literature on institutional theory has explored the capacity of institutions to constrain 
the behaviour of elites (North, 1990, Scott, 2014); however, contexts where institutions are 
incapable of achieving such expectation have attracted limited attention. This paper contributes 
to the nascent literature on corporate elitist influence by generating nuanced insights from a 
weak institutional context to aid our understanding of the role of elites in corporate governance. 
Our data indicate that elites influence institutional frameworks of corporate governance in 
1LJHULDWKHUHE\FKDOOHQJLQJ1RUWK¶VSURSRVLWLRQ2XUVWXG\reveals how the activities 
of three classes of elite, i.e. political elites, cultural elites and religious elites, have undermined 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in the country.  
 
Our discussions not only provide caution to the widely held assumption in the literature that 
institutions act as a check on the behaviour of economic actors (North, 1990), we also explore 
WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOYRLGDQGHOLWHV¶QDUUDWLYHVWRKLJKOLJKWSRVVLEOHGHYLDWLRQVIURPWKHPDLQVWUHDP
view of institutions. Our data show that institutional voids drive the emergence of elites and 
facilitate systemic corporate corruption. This study highlights the implications of elitist 
influences on corporate governance institutions in Nigeria, contending that the influence 
exerted by elites challenges institutional resilience. This affirms that, over a relatively short 
time, human intervention can motivate institutional changes (Lipset, 1960). This acts as 
instruments of deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) and undermines 
the institutional permanence argument (Dacin & Dacin, 2008). In sum, we further make two 
important contributions to the literature.  
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First, the institutional theory literature on corporate governance has focused on institutional 
frames which assume that the dominant variants of institutions in varieties of capitalism (see 
Giddens, 1984; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008) dictate the state of the 
institutional environment for corporate governance. However, as our study shows, the activities 
of elites in the political, cultural and religious domains impact existing institutions in Nigeria. 
This evidence contradicts the dominant theme in the institutionalism-based literature that 
emphasises the capacity of institutions to constrain agent (or elite) behaviour. Our study, 
however, indicates that systemic opportunity spaces, i.e. institutional voids, accelerate the 
ability of elites to influence institutions. This finding is empirically relevant to the corporate 
governance debate in the majority of sub-Saharan Africa and other weak institutional settings.  
 
Second, this research has generated important insights regarding the connections between 
religion, elites and corporate governance. Whereas political and cultural elites have attracted 
attention amongst scholars, the literature examining religious elites is extremely scarce. The 
emergence and the subsequent influence wielded by elites over corporate choices are explained 
by the herding power of religion notably in high religiosity environments. Our study has 
indicated that the degree of religiosity in society, and the concerns bordering on social security 
and poverty, inform and strengthen the presence and influence of religious elites. The 
implication for corporate governance is that in environments where there are opportunity 
spaces to engage in unethical practices by elites (such as corruption among religious leaders), 
devotees (i.e. stakeholders) are gradually motivated to operate by the (unethical) ideals of their 
religious leaders. 7KLVILQGLQJH[WHQGVWKHVFRSHRIµDFWRUV¶GLVFXVVHGLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOism 
literature, as this study demonstrates that religious elites can provoke institutional changes. 
Ahrens and Ferry (2016) affirm the importance of emotions (consistent with religion) in 
institutional change. 
 
In conclusion, this paper highlights the elitist influences on institutions that affect corporate 
governance. As Khan (2012) notes, this area of scholarship has attracted little attention in 
corporate governance research and the institutionalism-based literature. While drawing insights 
from Nigeria, we show that the institutional environment for corporate governance reflects 
elitist influences. As a result, we note that institutions of corporate governance represent a 
variable whose functionality relies on other conditions (in this case, elites).  
 
27 
 
Our discussions present some implications for practice. Widespread corruption, aided by 
institutional voids, disrupts the institutions that support good corporate governance. The 
ineffectiveness of institutions in developing economies is due, to a large extent, to the weak 
enforcement mechanism, smoothed by institutional voids. The existence of robust institutions 
in the advanced economies informs its strong enforcement strategies. We, therefore, propose 
that policy makers in Nigeria must improve the enforcement mechanisms for institutions of 
corporate governance to reduce the powers and influence wielded by elites. Also, there is the 
need to provide more resources towards strengthening the power of regulators and enforcement 
agents while minimising the overbearing influence of elites over regulators. 
 
 
7.0 Areas for Further Research  
The findings in this paper provide opportunities for further research. Engaging Nigeria as a 
proxy for developing economies, we provide empirical insights into the shapers of the 
institutional environment for corporate governance. This paper acknowledges that elitist 
influence restricts the degree to which institutional elements can check the behaviour of 
stakeholders. This outcome is however linked to variations in institutional effectiveness across 
different contexts, as these differences account for the emergence of institutional voids. 
Therefore, future research can advance this area of scholarship by undertaking similar 
investigations in other business environments in both developing and developed economies. 
This will not only DGGUHVV.KDQ¶V(2012) concerns regarding the incompleteness of literature 
H[DPLQLQJWKHUROHRIµHOLWHV¶LQEXVLQHVVenvironments but will facilitate the identification of 
the specific intervention and influence of elites regarding corporate governance. This area of 
scholarship is under-researched.  
 
Furthermore, the findings from our study relied on insights provided by participants drawn 
from organisations listed on the NSE and key corporate regulators in the country. While this 
questions the generalizability of the study outcomes, participants, however, included 
consultants who have undertaken various corporate governance consulting responsibilities in 
companies, not listed on the NSE. Thus, their contributions do reflect broad practices. 
Nonetheless, the largely informal nature of the institutional environment in developing 
economies has intensified the relevance of two other forms of businesses, i.e. small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and public (government) corporations. This study did not engage 
corporate elites in these business organisations. We suggest that the extant literature will 
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benefit from the examination of the views of stakeholders in these forms of business 
organisations. This would strengthen existing evidence regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and elites.   
 
Additionally, our evidence highlights the peculiarity of the institutional environments in 
developing economies. Given this peculiarity, further insights into the institutionalism-based 
literature, especially those addressing institutional concerns amongst developing economies, 
are necessary. Our study indicates that existing institutions have neither succeeded in 
narrowing institutional voids nor limit the incidence of corruption. Thus, we propose that future 
studies should explore complementary strategies for 'controlling' the influence of HOLWHV¶ other 
than those proposed in the institutionalism-based literature (i.e. institutions). This is because 
the nature of the institutional environment in developing economies demand the adoption of a 
different approach to addressing its institution-inspired problems. Importantly, this study has 
demonstrated that just as political, social, economic, and legal forms of institutionalisation have 
gained traction over the years in corporate governance research, the impact of elites on 
institutions deserves similar attention. 
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Appendix - Interview Guide 
 
1. Interview Background 
a. As a stakeholder in corporate governance in Nigeria, how would you assess the 
present state of corporate governance in Nigeria? 
b. What are the main problems confronting corporate governance in the country? 
 
2. Institutional Influences 
a. To what extent do you think that the following elements have impacted the 
practice of corporate governance in Nigeria; 
o Political system 
o Corruption 
o Culture and Ethnicity 
o Extent of Law and Order in the society  
o Religion 
b. How can the impact of the above issues on corporate governance be minimised? 
 
3. SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2003 and 2011) 
a. How would you access the contributions of the SEC codes (both 2003 and 2011) 
to the practice of corporate governance in the country? 
b. What is your view on codes reflecting the preferences of key drivers of the 
institutional environment? 
 
4. Necessary Reforms 
a. In your opinion, what governance reforms are necessary to improve corporate 
governance in the Nigerian business environment especially regarding the 
influences of key stakeholders? 
 
Thank you. 
 
